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Abstract 
 
Much theory and research that seeks to explain why and how technology transfers occur within 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) actually addresses the question of how these transfers occur among 
cooperative subsidiaries, and relies on the assumption of inter-subsidiary cooperation. However, 
subsidiaries do not always cooperate. We suggest that the success of technology transfer among 
subsidiaries depends on the extent to which the relationships among an MNE's subsidiaries (i.e. inter-
subsidiary) are competitive or cooperative. Inter-subsidiary cooperation is determined by the MNE's 
international strategy, organizational structure, and the social relationships among subsidiaries. Both 
hierarchical and social relational factors drive the potential for inter-subsidiary multimarket 
competition that originates from the overlap on the subsidiaries' products, technologies, and market 
portfolios. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing stream of literature in both strategy and international management highlights the role 
of subsidiaries in knowledge generation and diffusion. Several authors argued that the primary reason 
for the multinational's existence is its capability to explore, transfer, and exploit technology across 
boundaries more effectively and efficiently than market mechanisms (e.g., BIRKINSHAW & HOOD, 
1998; CONNER & PRAHALAD, 1996; KOGUT & ZANDER, 1993). Innovation in multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) is no longer simply the responsibility of the corporate center (NOHRIA & 
GHOSTAL, 1997). The corporate center was transformed from the "technology-creator" to the 
"technology-organizer" in its global operations (CANTWELL, 2001). Foreign subsidiaries not only 
serve the traditional function of adapting the parent MNE's technology to local market needs and 
providing technical support to local factories and customers (Cantwell, 2001; Doz, Bartlett, & 
Prahalad, 1981; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), but have also become significant sources of technological 
development (Cantwell, 1991, 1995; Cantwell & Janne, 1997; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989).   
 However, subsidiaries' ability to act as technology vehicles that absorb local technologies and 
facilitate the development of MNEs' worldwide capabilities (Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002) can 
be hindered in the presence of inter-subsidiary competitive behaviors. Such hindrance is likely to occur 
whenever loosely coupled organizational formats between the MNE's headquarters and the 
subsidiaries, and among the subsidiaries themselves, exist. In this situation, each subsidiary behaves 
autonomously and vies for its own interests. Despite being owned by the same parent (i.e., a 
hierarchical constraint), subsidiaries may act as relatively independent entities (Hedlund, 1986, 1993, 
1994) from which some degree of multimarket competition may arise (Kalnins, 2004). That is, 
subsidiaries are subunits under an MNE's hierarchical control and are, simultaneously, firms competing 
in the open markets, and within the MNE. When coordination mechanisms fail, competitive behaviors 
are likely to prevail and inter-subsidiary technology transfer may not occur.  
There is some evidence of the charter evolution of some subsidiaries indicating that these 
subsidiaries develop capabilities distinct from their headquarters and other subsidiaries (Birkinshaw & 
Hood, 1998). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998, p. 782) acknowledged the potential for "mismatch between 
the subsidiary's capability profile and its official charter", but they did not theorize beyond an "internal 
competition for charters". However, competitive behaviors may emerge from this mismatch, which 
occurs because subsidiaries expand their geographic and/or product markets to utilize their new 
capabilities. Inter-subsidiary competition emerges not only when some subsidiaries develop beyond 
their mandated charters and develop competencies that overlap those of other subsidiaries, but also in 
the internal struggle for the headquarters allocation of resources. Yet, Birkinshaw and Hood did not 
acknowledge the potential for competitive behaviors, and instead bound the analysis in terms of the 
knowledge codifiability and stickiness, and motivations of the subsidiaries. However, inter-subsidiary 
competition may arise where one might expect to see cooperation. 
Drawing from literature on multimarket competition, industrial organization, organizational 
models and design, and organizational knowledge and learning, we investigate intra-MNE cross-border 
technology transfer. Although extant research has examined various factors influencing technology 
transfer it has overlooked the importance of the cooperative or competitive relationships among 
subsidiaries for inter-subsidiary technology transfer. The extent to which subsidiaries exhibit 
cooperative or competitive behaviors will influence inter-subsidiary technology transfer. Specifically, 
we investigate the primary antecedents of subsidiaries' competitive or cooperative relationships within 
an MNE.  We focus on how the strategy and structure characteristics of the MNE and the social ties 
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among its subsidiaries affect inter-subsidiary relationships, and how the resulting competitive or 
cooperative relationships among subsidiaries influence the cross-border technology transfer within the 
MNE. We do not focus on the type of technology being transferred [e.g., management-, product-, 
process-related technologies (Grosse, 1996)] because these do not induce a certain level of cooperation 
or competition, although it is possible that management-related technologies require a higher level of 
cooperation for effective transfer. 
The remaining of this paper proceeds with a brief review of the literature on multimarket 
competition as the underlying conceptual rationale for the coexistence of competitive and cooperative 
behaviors among subsidiaries of the same parent MNE. The extent to which the relationships among 
subsidiaries are more competitive or cooperative determines the success of technology transfer. Then, 
we examine the effects of the MNE's structure, strategy and social relationships on inter-subsidiary 
cooperative relations. The paper concludes with implications and suggestions for additional inquiry. 
 
2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
Cross-border technology transfer by MNEs has been explored through various prisms. 
Technology transfer research has examined, for instance, how technology transfer affects MNEs 
foreign entry decisions (e.g., Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000), how the patterns of technology 
transfer vary across countries (e.g., Phene & Tallman, 2002), how the nature of technology impacts the 
transfer processes (e.g., Cantwell & Mudambi, 2001), how a host country's economy, culture, and 
technological advancement influence the technology transfer processes (e.g., Cantwell, 2001), the 
vehicles for cross-border technology transfer (e.g. FDI, licensing, technical assistance contract, training 
contract) (e.g., Cantwell, 2001), and so forth. All these factors are likely to impact technology transfer 
as noted in existing research. Research on technology transfer is important because technologies are 
neither geographically concentrated nor locally bounded (Dunning, 1998). Technology is developed 
across the world and localized firms may benefit from being exposed to that knowledge (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). Hence, whether MNE subsidiaries succeed or fail in transferring technologies has 
important performance implications for the MNE as a whole. Dierickx & Cool (1989) and Grant 
(1996), among many others, claimed that the firm's knowledge-base contributes most to its sustainable 
differentiation and consequently to its competitive advantage.  
 However, there is noticeably scarce research in international and strategic management 
specifically addressing intra-MNE (inter-subsidiary) flows of technology (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998; Hedlund, 1994; Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002), and the transfer mechanisms among 
subsidiaries (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Teece, 1981). Namely, research is scarce on examining 
source-recipient relationships (i.e., relationships among subsidiaries), but these may be a major driver 
of cross border technology transfer. In this paper, we argue that subsidiaries fail to transfer technology 
in the presence of inter-subsidiary competitive pressures, and we examine the main hierarchical and 
relational factors that shape inter-subsidiary relationships.   
The transfer of technologies among subsidiaries is subject to various factors. Figure 1 below 
depicts our conceptual model. As noted above, several factors have been researched, and their impact is 
known. For instance, the recipient's lack of absorptive capacity may hinder the transfer of technologies 
even though there is intention to transfer (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001; 
Szulanski, 1996), because the recipient subsidiary lacks the ability to understand, learn, and utilize the 
technology. The recipient subsidiary may lack, for example, knowledge of previous technologies 
because it did not invest in these in the past (Kogut, 1991); which may be particularly relevant for 
sequential and incremental technological advancements. The location of the recipient subsidiary may 
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also hinder its ability to recognize the value and relevance of the technology, and therefore the 
subsidiary may have no interest in the transfer. The location and technological sophistication of the 
source subsidiary also influences the success of technology transfer. In addition, the characteristics of 
the technologies to be transferred influence the success of technology transfer (Cantwell & Mudambi, 
2001; Lord & Ranft, 2000). For example, the codification, ambiguity, and tacitness of the technology 
impacts on the transfer practices (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999; Polanyi, 
1966). Finally, there may be other exogenous environmental variables such as the industry in which the 
subsidiaries operate (Teece, 1996; Tripsas, 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). For example, in fast 
changing industries MNE will likely seek to have technologies transferred directly from one subsidiary 
to another to speed learning and implementation in each location.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although many variables have been examined to assess technology transfer, less research has 
focused on the importance of the relationships among the subsidiaries for technology transfer. In this 
paper, we focus on the source-recipient relationship and the extent to which they assume cooperative or 
competitive behaviors that will likely influence international technology transfer. We discuss the 
influence of strategy, structure and social interaction on the competitive/cooperative behaviors among 
subsidiaries as antecedents of the relationships among subsidiaries. Further, we discuss each of these as 
having independent effects; although we envision the possibility that there may be additive effects, we 
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do not propose specific additive relationships. The following section highlights that, in the absence of 
appropriate coordination, control, and integration systems, subsidiaries may be subject to multimarket 
competition and thus have lower technology transfer incentives.  
 
3 MULTIMARKET COMPETITION 
 
The concept of multimarket competition was initially developed to describe inter-firm 
competition. Multimarket competition has been primarily studied by industrial organization (IO) 
economists and game theorists to refer to "competitive situations in which the same firms compete 
against each other in multiple markets" (Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999: 46; Karnani & 
Wernerfelt, 1985; Kalnins, 2004). Chen (1996) proposed a framework for competitor analysis 
incorporating market commonality and resource similarity, and recognized the asymmetry of market 
interdependence. Using a resource-based approach, Chen (1996) defined market commonality as "the 
degree of presence that a competitor manifests in the markets it overlaps with the focal firm", whereas 
resource similarity was defined as "the degree to which a given competitor possesses strategic 
endowments comparable to those of the focal firm in both type and quantity". The extent of market 
commonality and resource similarity shared with competitors drive, at least partly, firms' strategic 
competitive decisions. In the context of multimarket competition, Jayachandran et al. (1999: 51) also 
recognized the potential for collusion among market players (particularly in oligopolistic market 
structures) and defined mutual forbearance as "tacit collusion as a consequence of firms competing in 
many markets and the resulting increase in their interdependence" (see also Haveman & Nonnemaker, 
2000). This is particularly important for MNEs because the relationships among subsidiaries are likely 
to be one of the most important factors in constructing MNE advantages. For instance, subsidiaries' 
interaction is important to understand how MNEs are able to learn from locating in knowledge clusters, 
given that a core assumption of MNEs existence is that they will be able to leverage the knowledge and 
technologies acquired in some locations to other locations. 
Viewing the MNE as a "network" structure integrating differentiated units (Cantwell & 
Mudambi, 2001; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Hedlund, 1986, 1994; Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1997), we extend the concept of multimarket competition to within the MNE. We argue 
that multimarket competition may be observed in intra-MNE (i.e., inter-subsidiary) relations, as 
subsidiaries compete with each other for markets and parental resources. Subsidiaries are relatively free 
agent operating within certain parent-defined parameters (i.e., an hierarchy) but integrated in a fairly 
loose manner [e.g., Hedlund's (1986) heterarchy, or Nohria & Ghoshal's (1997) network model]. 
Furthermore, some subsidiaries often have proactive roles, as noted by Birkinshaw (2001, p. 393) 
"many firm resources and capabilities are actually developed at the subsidiary level" because it is the 
subsidiary's manager who has the local contacts and the intimate knowledge of local activities, not the 
executives at the headquarters. For example, subsidiaries located in clusters of excellence may be more 
autonomous from the headquarters (Hedlund, 1986) but if they engage in competitive behaviors with 
sibling subsidiaries technology transfers among these subsidiaries may not occur.  
Notwithstanding, there are fundamental differences when extending the concept of multimarket 
competition between independent firms to inter-subsidiary relationships. The existence of headquarters 
distinguishes inter-subsidiary competition (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000) from that among 
independent firms. For example, competition among independent firms is not subject to hierarchical 
pressures, and independent firms enjoy high autonomy to select the competitive strategies that best fit 
their competitive landscapes. However, subsidiaries need to balance the potential hazards and benefits 
from integration, coordination, and control. The hierarchy (ownership control) is at the heart of such 
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integration, and the deployment of scarce resources is a distinct task, but the geographic distance 
underlying inter-subsidiary interaction entails various market and management difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the differences between inter-firm and intra-MNE competition do not attenuate a 
multimarket competition scenario, rather these dissimilarities exaggerate the scenario described in 
multimarket competition theories. Subsidiaries need to pay more attention to the co-existence of 
competition and cooperation with other sister subsidiaries, than an independent firm would be required 
to do. Cooperative relationships among subsidiaries are associated with technology transfer success 
while internal competition with transfer hindrance.  
Why may some subsidiaries compete? We note three main reasons for the existence of inter-
subsidiary competition. First, inter-subsidiary competition may stem from the rivalry for resources 
from the parent firm. Subsidiaries compete not only in the external market for scarce resources as 
independent firms do, but also in the internal market for parental resources. The greater the extent to 
which subsidiaries compete for similar resources, the more their propensity to engage in competitive 
behaviors. 
Second, inter-subsidiary competition may originate from related product and geographic 
diversification strategies. In the absence of tight integration and coordination, autonomous subsidiaries 
enlarge their pool of capabilities (Birkinshaw, 1996) and may seek placement for their technologies and 
products outside their original geographic market. This may create a situation of market commonality, 
or overlap with the market of other subsidiaries, and parallels Birkinshaw and Hood's (1998) "charter 
change" which originates when some subsidiaries develop beyond their mandated charters and grow 
competencies that supersede those of other subsidiaries. A competitive attack by one subsidiary in the 
major market of the other subsidiary is then likely to generate a reaction of the latter in the first 
subsidiary's domain (Jayachandran et al., 1999). If the markets of competing subsidiaries overlap in 
multiple locations these subsidiaries are held in multimarket competition, and a competitive game 
unfolds where one may stereotypically expect to observe inter-subsidiary cooperation.  
Finally, inter-subsidiary competition may be rooted in an under-defined specialization of each 
subsidiary. When the rights and responsibilities, the goals and market scope of each subsidiary are not 
clearly defined conflicts may arise. Each subsidiary vies for its own interests, and to the extent that 
these interests overlap competition among subsidiaries intensifies (a phenomenon that Fauli-Oller & 
Giralt (1995) labeled as "negative spillover" among MNE subsidiaries). Thus, inter-subsidiary 
competition may emerge from resource similarities and originate competition, regardless whether or 
not there is market commonality. 
The principal belief that MNEs possess superior resources, or capabilities, to overcome the 
traditional liabilities of foreignness in host locations (Hymer, 1976) is based on the assumption that 
MNEs are able not only to diffuse their stock of technologies to the subsidiaries, but also to convey the 
technologies developed locally by each subsidiary to other MNE progenies (Kogut & Zander, 1993). It 
is worth noting at the outset that any one subsidiary may benefit from cooperating in the transfer of 
technology to other subsidiaries, and to coordinate with each other and with headquarters for various 
reasons. For example, the operations of one subsidiary may benefit from inputs from other subsidiaries, 
and foster an efficient system of subsidiary specialization and interdependence (Birkinshaw, 1996; 
Birkinshaw & Ridderstrale, 1999). By pooling together assets, resources, and capabilities subsidiaries 
may have access to technologies, learning experiences, resources and capabilities that none possesses 
independently, and develop absorptive capacity for future technology inflows. In addition, technology 
sharing fosters a trustworthy and cooperative profile among subsidiaries, which will likely lead to 
future inflows of technology. Thus, by cooperating with other siblings each subsidiary increases the 
likelihood that others will cooperate with it, and hence enlarges the pool of technologies it may draw 
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upon. 
Proposition 1. Inter-subsidiary cooperative relationships are more likely to promote international 
technology transfers within an MNE, in contrast to inter-subsidiary competitive relationships. 
  
4 CHARACTERISTICS OF MNES AND INTERNAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
MNEs exist because of their ability to transfer and exploit technology across geographic 
locations more effectively and efficiently than market mechanisms (CONNER & PRAHALAD, 1996; 
KOGUT & ZANDER, 1993). Kogut and Zander (1993) explain the existence of MNEs by their relative 
efficiency in the transfer of tacit knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is difficult to codify, based on 
routines, and embedded in the human capital) compared to market mechanisms (NELSON & WINTER, 
1982; WILLIAMSON, 1985). Furthermore, the MNE is not simply a mechanism through which costs 
are reduced, but rather a vehicle for exploiting existing technologies, and for the recombination of these 
technologies to produce new technologies (KOGUT & ZANDER, 1992; 1993). In the following 
sections we examine how an MNE's international strategy, two major aspects of its organizational 
structure (i.e., the role of the headquarters, and the reward system), and the view of MNEs as networks 
(inter-subsidiary social communication), promote, or obstruct, inter-subsidiary technology transfer.  
 
4.1 MNE STRATEGY  
 
In the early 1980s, Prahalad (1976), Doz (1980), Doz, Bartlett and Prahalad (1981), and 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) developed the Integration-Responsiveness framework (I-R), which shifted the 
analysis of organization design from formal structures to managerial processes. This framework 
classifies four types of international strategies utilized by MNEs along two dimensions: local 
responsiveness, and global integration. The I-R model proposes the following typology: international, 
multinational, global, and transnational strategies. Porter's (1986)  coordination-configuration model 
finds some parallelism with the I-R framework. Both models provide a useful tool for the analysis of 
firms' international strategies.  
When both the pressures for local responsiveness and for global integration are low, an 
international strategy is more likely to be implemented. An international strategy does not demand 
local responsiveness, and the firm's foreign strategies are supported in the replication of what seems to 
have worked well at home. The subsidiaries are autonomous from each other and the only technology 
transfer channel is from the parent to the subsidiaries. A multinational strategy entails 
local responsiveness as an attempt to overcome markets' idiosyncrasies. The firm is composed of fairly 
autonomous subsidiaries that are responsive to the host country market in which they are located 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1988). Under a multinational strategy, there is no clear need for inter-subsidiary 
cooperation; and the desire to grow may motivate local subsidiaries to compete with subsidiaries at 
other geographic locations. Therefore, inter-subsidiary competition is likely to be intense when 
compared to the competitive intensity among subsidiaries of MNEs pursuing an international strategy. 
Both international and multinational strategies require little integration among subsidiaries, and the 
subsidiaries' operations tend to be more locally independent.  
Both global and transnational strategies deal with high pressure for worldwide integration. 
Global strategies respond to a view of the world as a single marketplace in which all consumers are 
alike (Leavitt, 1983). MNEs commercialize standardized products worldwide to take advantage of 
global economies of scale and scope, supporting their competitive advantages in tightly coupled 
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subsidiaries and coordination and control mechanisms. MNEs adopting global strategies concentrate 
production in low-cost countries, and use global marketing and advertising to reach their customers. 
The high reliance among subsidiaries on the same value chain makes competition among subsidiaries 
relatively weak for MNEs pursuing a global strategy. Firms pursuing transnational strategies recognize 
cost advantages of economies of scale and scope, but are sensitive to differences in national markets. 
MNEs pursuing a transnational strategy seek to achieve simultaneously global efficiency and local 
responsiveness with the resources and activities dispersed but specialized. Transnational strategies are 
characterized by a high degree of inter-subsidiary interdependence (i.e., a high volume of intra-MNE 
trade flows) that results in relatively weak inter-subsidiary competition. Subsidiaries highly responsive 
to local markets are expected to create new technologies and transfer them to other subsidiaries and to 
the headquarters. Taking the MNE as a whole we expect less competition and more coordination 
displayed among subsidiaries of firms pursuing global or transnational strategies due to the higher level 
of integration and coordination exhibited.  
Proposition 2. Inter-subsidiary cooperation will be higher and competition lower in MNEs 
pursuing globally integrated strategies than for firms pursuing nationally independent strategies.  
Rather than categorizing MNEs' internal and external requirements some scholars called for the 
examination of MNEs as networks of differentiated subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991; Hedlund, 1994; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997) whereby subsidiaries have specialized 
roles. For example, Palmer, Jennings and Zhou's (1993, p. 103) statement that organizations are "arenas 
in which coalitions with different interests and capacities for influence vie for dominance" seems to suit 
the network approach, but also highlights the potential for competitive behaviors. Similar to the I-R 
framework, network researchers also argue that MNEs stressing global integration experience more 
internal technology flows than MNEs requiring a relatively lower integration. Higher integration 
strategies are more likely to be associated with more extensive inter-subsidiary cooperation.  
 
4.2 MNE STRUCTURE  
 
MNEs are heterogeneous entities composed of functionally differentiated subsidiaries pursuing 
specific goals and interests (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). The organizational structure that integrates, 
coordinates, and controls subsidiaries' actions is essential to ensure that subsidiaries are driven by 
company-wide interests rather than by local priorities (Birkinshaw, 2001). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
suggested that organizational subunits adapt differentially to their specific environmental landscapes, 
leading the authors to conclude that organizations encountering heterogeneous environments need more 
structural differentiation and integration to succeed. Thus, the organizational structure influences inter-
subsidiary behaviors, and, ultimately, technology transfers. 
Role of MNE headquarters. Cantwell (2001) argued that the role of MNEs' headquarters has 
shifted from "technology creator" to "technology organizer". Subsidiaries, and not the headquarters, are 
increasingly responsible for generating and transferring new technologies. Fast changing environments 
require speed in transferring and adopting new technologies, which is more swift and efficient when 
subsidiaries transfer directly to other subsidiaries. Thus, direct technology transfers from headquarters 
to subsidiaries are declining and inter-subsidiary transfers are increasing. However, in contrast to 
technology transfers within domestic firms, where both the source and the recipient units are 
proximally located, are likely aware of each other's capabilities and markets, and are tied by cohesive, 
personal, relationships the transfer of technologies may be more difficult for MNEs because 
subsidiaries are geographically dispersed (Strang & Soule, 1998; Wejnert, 2002). Subsidiaries that are 
distant from each other, separated by cultural barriers, technological distances (Phene & Tallman, 
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2002), and subject to communication hazards may be unaware of other subsidiaries' achievements or 
needs, making inter-subsidiary technology transfer a more arduous endeavor (Wejnert, 2002). 
Notwithstanding, by increasing decentralization of decision making to lower levels (i.e., to the 
subsidiary) the headquarters promote learning and cooperation among subsidiaries. 
The headquarters, as technology organizer, influence inter-subsidiary technology transfer. First, 
the headquarters have hierarchical (or ownership) relations over the subsidiaries. Equity ownership 
control is a legitimate authority that a firm has over its assets (Hennart, 1988; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997), 
and provides headquarters with the ability to control inter-subsidiaries' relationships. For example, 
converting competitive behaviors in cooperative ties. Second, the headquarters have informational 
advantages over sibling subsidiaries (Zander & Solvell, 2000). Positioned centrally in an MNE's 
information network, the headquarters operates as the "architect" (Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002) 
for inter-subsidiary technology exchanges, regulating technologies in transit and recombining 
technology exchanges among subsidiaries. Third, the headquarters control de allocation of resources 
among subsidiaries, and hence influence subsidiaries' strategic choices and behaviors. The headquarters 
centralize both tangible and intangible resources on which the subsidiary may depend to develop 
specific strategic factors (e.g. Tyco's headquarters takes all subsidiary's profits and the subsidiary is 
absolutely dependent on the parent firm - Hill & Jones, 2001). Resource independent subsidiaries are 
less dependent on headquarters' resources, and are more likely to compete with other subsidiaries, 
rather than exhibiting forbearance (collusive or cooperative) behaviors (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 
2000). Therefore, through centralization, headquarters guarantee inter-subsidiary transfers, and by 
decentralizing, headquarters promote inter-subsidiary competition.  
Thus, the degree of decentralization is likely to be negatively related to the propensity to 
transfer locally developed technologies. Subsidiaries of MNEs with a decentralized, loose, structure 
compete for their own interests. For example, larger decentralization may lead subsidiaries to expand 
their product and market mandate, and compete in other subsidiary's focal market(s). Conversely, 
MNEs pursuing more extensive centralization and control over inter-subsidiary relationships are more 
capable of overseeing competition, and encourage inter-subsidiary cooperation, which will likely result 
in more intra-MNE technology transfers.  
 
Proposition 3. Inter-subsidiary cooperation will be higher and competition lower in MNEs with more 
extensive centralization of control at the headquarters than in MNEs with less extensive centralization 
of control at the headquarters. 
 
Reward system. The reward system is an internal mechanism to achieve congruence of 
objectives and actions among subsidiaries and headquarters. March and Simon (1958), for example, 
noted that incentive systems (or reward systems) impact individuals' behavior. Gupta and Govindarajan 
(2000) argued that a reward system based on the performance of the whole MNE (i.e., a systemic 
reward system) would motivate technology outflows (i.e., the transfer of locally developed 
technologies to other subsidiaries) but de-motivate technology inflows. Conversely, a reward system 
based only on each subsidiary's performance (i.e., an individually based reward system) motivates the 
subsidiary's manager to seek and learn advanced technologies.  Some difficulties in designing an 
effective reward system may be briefly noted. For example, although some studies suggest that a 
reward system based on the whole MNE's performance (i.e., a systemic reward systems) motivates the 
source subsidiary to transfer technologies to other subsidiaries, there may be free-riding behaviors by 
the source subsidiary that may deter any technology outflow. That is, the source subsidiary may not 
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commit to the technology outflow because whether the recipient subsidiary uses efficiently the 
technology does not affect the source's performance evaluation. Therefore, headquarters face a reward 
design dilemma -- the reward system needs to promote simultaneous incentives for technology transfer 
for the source and the recipient subsidiaries.  
Parallel to our distinction between systemic and individually-based reward systems is the 
identification of two basic reward systems into objective and subjective (Golden & Ma, 2002; Hill et 
al., 1992; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). To alleviate performance ambiguity problems when competition 
and cooperation coexist within M-form organizations Hill et al. (1992) recommended expanding the 
breadth of information available to corporate management (i.e., cooperation between units can be 
encouraged when subjective measures of division performance are considered in corporate resource 
and reward allocation decisions). Such evaluation systems ensure that the "business unit 
managers…who cooperate with their counterparts in other business unit…will not be punished if their 
performance falls short according to conventional measures of financial performance" (Golden & Ma, 
2002, p. 14). Therefore, a systemic, or subjective, reward system encourages inter-subsidiary 
cooperation, and values collaborative behaviors aimed at increasing other subsidiaries' performance, 
and the overall performance of the MNE. A systemic reward model preempts internal competition 
because it bases the evaluation of a focal subsidiary on its contributions to the whole MNE. 
Individually-based reward systems are based on the individual subsidiary's performance. In 
contrast to systemic reward systems, individual reward systems are likely to generate inter-subsidiary 
competition (Galbraith, 1973) because subsidiaries will tend to focus on improving their own 
performance, rather than coordinating with the other subsidiaries. For example, Mascarenhas (1984) 
noted that an individually-based reward system based on financial measures of MNE subsidiaries does 
not generate inter-subsidiary cooperation. A focus on individual performance evaluations motivates 
subsidiaries to search actively for advanced technologies for their own use and may lead to a 
competitive game in which each subsidiary is interested in technology inflows (i.e., absorbing) but not 
in outflows (i.e., conceding). This competition may provide some explanation for why any technology 
management advantage of MNEs, as assumed in previous studies, may be unrealized. Thus, individual 
reward systems based on a focal subsidiary's performance are more effective if little inter-subsidiary 
cooperation is required. Conversely, a systemic reward system is more likely to promote inter-
subsidiary cooperative efforts such as technology transfers. 
 
Proposition 4. Inter-subsidiary cooperation will be higher and competition lower in MNEs 
pursuing a systemic reward system (based on the overall contribution to the MNE) than in MNEs 
pursuing an individual reward system (based on the individual performance of each subsidiary). 
 
4.3 THE MNE AS A NETWORK 
 
 MNEs that expand internationally based on a network of independent, autonomous, and 
self-sufficient subsidiaries may face a substantial challenge in achieving effective inter-subsidiary 
coordination. In this case, either the subsidiaries do not communicate enough among themselves (e.g., 
not transferring technologies, best practices, or local knowledge), or each subsidiary vies for its own 
interests in partial disregard for the interests of the overall MNE. For example, Philips has been noted 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1988) as being unable to assume market leadership despite its innovative activity. 
We note two main factors for Phillips' lack of market success: (1) the need to assure the flow of 
technologies from the subsidiaries to the overall organization through management and strategic 
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processes, and (2) the importance of having responsibility, accountability, and communication 
mechanisms to foster transfers among subsidiaries.  
The network model of the MNE (or heterarchy, according to Hedlund, 1986) relies on the view 
of loosely tied subsidiaries that have the freedom to develop their own resource positions (Birkinshaw 
& Hood, 1998; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). A network structure reflects a division of labor and 
knowledge, and some interdependence among subsidiaries since each subsidiary is dependent on the 
others for specialized inputs. Furthermore, the network model entails evolution at the subsidiary level 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) whose mandates may evolve as the subsidiary develops valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), dynamic 
capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), or architectural capabilities 
(Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). Birkinshaw & Hood (1998), thus, noted that the accumulation 
of resources and capabilities at the subsidiary reduces the dependence of the focal subsidiary on the 
other subsidiaries of the MNE (see also Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Prahalad & Doz, 1987). In sum, some subsidiaries charter evolves, and these subsidiaries become more 
loosely tied to the headquarters' directives and control (Birkinshaw, 1995). The MNE may need to 
focus on fostering relational ties and communication to promote inter-subsidiary cooperation. 
Inter-subsidiary social communication decreases the potential for (multimarket) competitive 
behaviors, and rather promotes cooperation. Departing from previous studies defining inter-subsidiary 
communication as the formal report system of financial or production information, we emphasize the 
informal and social communication relationships among subsidiaries and subsidiaries' managers. Social 
communication increases inter-subsidiary awareness of other subsidiaries' status, product lines 1 , 
market plans, pool of technologies, retaliatory ability, and promotes inter-subsidiary familiarity2 
possibly contributing to develop social ties among subsidiary managers (Chen & Miller, 1994; 
Jayachandran et al., 1999). Multimarket competition literature considers awareness as an essential 
prerequisite for action (Chen, 1996). The higher the awareness the easier it is for subsidiaries to 
recognize opportunities for technology transfer. Thus, social communication decreases the potential for 
market entry in the other subsidiaries' focal markets. Inter-subsidiary social communication also 
promotes integration (Lorsch & Lawrence, 1965) and the socialization of the subsidiaries into the 
overall MNE's values, mission, and objectives. Furthermore, inter-subsidiary social communication 
decreases technologies' causal ambiguity, increases subsidiaries ability to evaluate, learn, and utilize 
similar technologies, and identify opportunities for technology transfer. Hedlund (1994), for example, 
emphasized lateral communication across the whole MNE and the catalytic, or architectural, role of top 
managers in the process. Inter-subsidiary social communication promotes cooperation, and may be 
sponsored through formal organizational programs such as managers' rotation, meetings, conferences, 
joint-task forces, and interlocking directorates (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; Strang & Soule, 1998). These 
programs are typically designed to foster inter-subsidiary cooperation and promote cohesive ties among 
subsidiaries' managers. Social communication increases not only inter-subsidiary familiary, and trust 
among managers, but also promotes an organizational culture encouraging cooperation. An example 
may be found in the management exchange programs at Asean Brown Brovery (ABB) and the constant 
flow of an elite cadre of 500 top managers among subsidiaries (Hill & Jones, 2001). In sum, inter-
subsidiary social communication works to preempt competitive behaviors and is likely to facilitate 
transfers. 
                                                 
1
 The more extensive the product lines the more occasions for product-market overlap exist. 
2
 Familiarity assumes some degree of coordination because firms become aware of others' capabilities, resources and 
strategic actions. Thus, it is one of the mechanisms for mutual forbearance. 
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Proposition 5. Inter-subsidiary cooperation will be higher and competition lower in MNEs with 
more inter-subsidiary social communication than in MNEs with less inter-subsidiary social 
communication. 
 
It is noteworthy that incentives for technology transfer, such as promotion of inter-subsidiary 
communication or reward systems, aim at overcoming potential competitive behaviors or, at least, 
fostering inter-subsidiary cooperative dynamics. It is the headquarters that may override competitive 
pressures through the exercise of control, coordination, and integration (i.e., through the use of 
hierarchy). In sum, inter-subsidiary international technology transfer is subject to the influences of the 
MNE's international strategy, organizational structure and relational attributes. Multinationals can no 
longer take for granted that their subsidiaries absorb local technologies and pool local resources to 
create and transfer new technologies. The next section develops a final discussion and concluding 
remarks. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The extent of competitive and cooperative behaviors among subsidiaries seems to be dependent 
on the organizational model, coordination, and control and integration of activities dispersed worldwide. 
We used the concept of multimarket competition to highlight that under certain conditions multimarket 
competition may arise among MNE subsidiaries. The potential to bring game theory into international 
strategy research should not be disregarded. We examined technology transfer in the context of 
potential competitive pressures between subsidiaries, in contrast to the transfers when subsidiaries 
cooperate, as is generally assumed in the majority of existing research. When the subsidiaries are 
managed as autonomous entities (e.g., heterarchy or network models) pursuing their own goals, there is 
a possibility that we may observe subsidiaries growing and diversifying into related and unrelated 
product and geographic markets, and competing with their sister subsidiaries in their focal markets. 
This seems to have been the case with some of ABB's subsidiaries (see Hill & Jones, 2001).  
 Although this paper is conceptual, and we do not test the propositions advanced, a 
number of possible implications for managers may be drawn. Managers need to understand whether 
technology transfer between subsidiaries is critical for competitive advantage and the importance of 
cooperative or competitive behaviors among subsidiaries to access and develop technologies. When 
technology transfer is important managers need to evaluate the extent to which subsidiaries are 
cooperative or competitive and align strategy, structure, and social relationships among subsidiaries to 
maximize transfers. At a more specific level, while the current trend has been towards non-hierarchical 
management models, such as the multidivisional, the M-form, and the network models, these 
organizational forms may have a negative impact on the extent to which MNEs are able to learn and 
diffuse internally locally acquired technologies. The current trend has also been towards defining 
systemic reward systems, and this paper supports this current trend. However, managers may need, at a 
minimum, to increase monitoring, or build social communication mechanisms to promote transfers. 
Communication, however, must be more than formal reporting in order to facilitate cooperation; it 
must add social and informal communication and tie-building mechanisms. That is, technology transfer 
does not occur automatically, as seems often assumed in extant research. MNEs need to manage the 
transfer process, and create a corporate culture and transfer mechanisms that ensure cooperation, and 
thus, ensure effective international technology transfers.   
 Managers may further consider a configurational model supported in specialized centers 
of responsibility to assure inter-subsidiary technology transfer. For example, Ericsson developed a 
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model whereby each subsidiary is specialized and responsible for the technological innovations in 
particular areas (e.g. transmission systems, mobile phones, digital switches, and software development). 
These subsidiaries are also responsible to transfer the technology to headquarters and to other 
subsidiaries. In sum, an essential element to ensure inter-subsidiary technology transfer relies on an 
organizational configuration based on a system of reciprocal dependence among subsidiaries (i.e., a 
network model of integrated and cooperative subsidiaries).  
An empirical test of the propositions we advanced seems a fruitful avenue for additional 
research. The search for empirical support will benefit technology transfer literature and disclose other 
dimensions that impact intra-firm technology transfers. The operationalization of the major constructs 
(i.e., MNE strategy, MNE structure, inter-subsidiary competition, inter-subsidiary cooperation, and 
internal technology transfer) may rely on existing scales and surveys. Birkinshaw (2001), for example, 
offers a good template to operationalize global integration, and but other studies exist that offer 
validated scales for inter-subsidiary relationships, internal technology transfer, and some organizational 
structure features of the MNE. Measures for internal technology transfer may be designed in terms of 
actual outcomes such as the occurrence and success of previous transfers, and be based on Kostova's 
work (1997). Additionally, interviews may be conducted to assess the intention to transfer and whether 
technology transfer was a subsidiary strategic decision or a corporate policy. Finally, empirical studies 
may need to control for cultural distance, the MNE home base, the absorptive ability of the subsidiary, 
and government regulations (Navaretti & Tarr, 2000). 
We conceptualized the four main factors (see left hand boxes in figure 1) as having independent 
effects, maybe additive. Future research may explore whether there may be interactions and moderation 
effects among them. We do not suggest moderation effects because we do not find theoretical support 
for the extent and direction of such moderating effects. Notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that cooperation may exist even if the firm pursues a globally integrated strategy and the subsidiaries 
are highly socially embedded (extensive social communication). Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1989) 
discussion of Philips is illustrative: Philips has been noted to seek larger integration among subsidiaries 
but the social ties or social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) between subsidiaries' managers (which 
are largely Dutch expatriates) seem to have prevented larger integration. Hence, we discuss each 
variable as independent with possibly additive effects.  
Future research is warranted on the extent to which cooperation and competition exist as a 
continuum or rather as related but somewhat different dimensions. For example, cooperation and 
competition may co-exist simultaneously, such as in the situations where subsidiaries cooperate in 
R&D but compete for market share. Does this mean that competition and cooperation are orthogonal? 
In our conceptualization we allowed for a neutral point of simultaneous low, or non-existent, 
competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, further research is needed to clarify this issue. Other 
research avenues entail investigating how transfer capabilities affect technology transfer flows among 
subsidiaries even within a competitive game. The capability to transfer technology depends not only on 
the recipient's absorptive capacity but also on the technology's codifiability, sophistication, and ease of 
transfer within the MNE. Investigating how subsidiaries combine their own technological uniqueness 
with new technologies from other subsidiaries is interesting for work on the knowledge multinational. 
Finally, we may research how the type of technology (e.g., product, process, or management) 
influences both the transfer process and success. For instance, transfer of management technologies 
may be subject to higher inter-subsidiary competition than product technologies.  
To conclude, in this paper we suggested that international and strategic management research 
have a promising avenue in the study of how some subsidiaries may develop competitive behaviors that 
hinder the overall MNE from fully exploiting the capacity to absorb local knowledge. This is in 
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contrast to extant theory and research that seeks to explain why and how technology transfers occur 
within multinational enterprises but has generally assumed inter-subsidiary cooperation. A current 
explanation for the existence of multinational enterprises is that MNEs are able to capture technologies 
and knowledge that are bounded to a locality such as an industry cluster (Porter, 1998), and internalize 
that knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993). We advanced that the success of inter-subsidiary technology 
transfer depends on the extent to which the relationships among subsidiaries are competitive or 
cooperative. Furthermore, while technology transfer studies have not paid enough attention to social 
embeddeness and internal structural characteristics such as the reward systems, these may be important 
drivers of competitive pressures among subsidiaries and therefore have an impact on the MNE's ability 
to learn. Hierarchical and social relational factors drive the potential for inter-subsidiary (multimarket) 
competition that originates from the overlap on the subsidiaries' products, technologies, and market 
portfolios. Inter-subsidiary competition seems to be a significant challenge as a growing number of 
studies and authors suggest flexible and network-like organizational models for the MNE. 
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TRANSFERÊNCIA DE TECNOLOGIA EM MNES: COMPETIÇÃO E COOPERAÇÃO 
INTER-SUBSIDIÁRIAS 
 
Resumo 
 
Muitas das teorias e pesquisas procuram explicar por que e como a transferência de tecnologia acontece 
nas empresas multinacionais (MNE) dirigem-se a questão de como estas transferências ocorrem entre 
subsidiarias cooperativas, e assumem a cooperação inter-subsidiárias. Entretanto, nem sempre as 
subsidiárias cooperam. Sugerimos que o sucesso da transferência de tecnologia entre subsidiárias 
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depende da extensão da relação de cooperação ou competição entre as subsidiárias das MNE. A 
cooperação inter-subsidiária é determinada pela estratégia internacional da MNE, pela estrutura 
organizacional e pelas relações sociais entre as subsidiárias. Tanto os fatores de relações sociais como 
hierárquicos dirigem o potencial para a competição inter-subsidiária multi-mercado que se origina da 
sobreposição dos produtos, tecnologias e portfolios de mercado. 
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